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COMMENT
North Carolina Guardianship Laws-The Need for (Change
The following facts from In Re Propst' illustrate the fundamental
unfairness of North Carolina's antiquated guardianship laws. Upon the
death of her father, Mrs. Laura Carswell inherited an undivided one-
fifth interest in a tract of land in Burke County, North Carolina. A
widow with two children, Mrs. Carswell apparently spent some time "in
the country," because, on one outing, she received a notice "at about 11
o'clock to appear at 12 o'clock, on the same day, at Morganton, for
some purpose she did not understand."2 Since she was in the country,
she "could not attend," but she later discovered that "some proceeding
was had in which she was adjudged to be an idiot . . . ."I A Mr.
Propst had been appointed her guardian, and, a few days after his
appointment, he promptly sold Mrs. Carswelrs inheritance to his wife,
Mrs. Gertrude Propst. Mrs. Carswell received no compensation for the
lost property.4
The laws under which this proceeding was conducted have been
only slightly amended since their enactment in the late 1800's.5 What-
ever their merits at the time they first appeared, it is clear that, by
today's standards, these statutes are unconstitutional and inadequate.
Not only do they fail to provide due process protections, but they also
fail to provide appropriate guardians for persons in need of guardian-
ship services, such as the mentally handicapped.
The need for revising North Carolina's guardianship :laws becomes
urgent in view of the fact that one of every twelve persons born in
the United States will receive treatment in a mental institution at some
point during his life. 6 The great majority of these persons can function
outside of an institution if they receive minimal guidance from someone
1. 144 N.C. 562, 57 S.E. 342 (1907).
2. Id. at 563-64, 57 S.E. at 343.
3. Id. at 564, 57 S.E. at 343.
4. Id. at 565, 57 S.E. at 343.
5. Compare N.C. CODE ch. 54 (1868-69).
6. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1
(1969), cited in Comment, North Carolina's New Mental Health Laws: More Due
Process, 52 N.C.L. REV. 589 (1973).
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such as a guardian.7 In recognition of these facts, several states, whose
statutes suffered from inadequacies similar to those found in the North
Carolina statutes, have taken action to improve their laws. This com-
ment will identify the shortcomings of the North Carolina provisions
and then evaluate the legislation recently adopted by other states. This
process can aid lawmakers in devising a guardianship system free of the
defects that currently plague North Carolina's statutes.'
NORTH CAROLINA GUARDIANSHIP LAW
Four chapters of the North Carolina General Statutes affect guardi-
anship of mentally disabled persons. Chapter 330 prescribes the man-
ner in which most guardians are appointed and defines many of their
powers and responsibilities. Chapter 3510 sets forth the procedures
whereby persons may be judicially declared incompetent and requires
the appointment of guardians for such incompetent persons. Chapter
122"1 deals with hospitalization of mentally disabled persons for whom
guardians may be appointed. And finally, chapter 1A'2 provides that
whenever an incompetent person is the plaintiff or defendant in a civil
action, a guardian ad litem must be appointed to protect that person's
interests.'3 These chapters will be discussed and criticized separately.
Chapter 33
Section 33-1 grants the clerks of superior court 4 the power to
appoint guardians for "infants, idiots, lunatics, [and] inebriates.""' The
7. "Eighty-five percent of all mentally retarded persons, however, are capable,
with proper training, of becoming productive, self-supporting citizens in either competi-
tive or sheltered employment." Hodgson, Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons:
Three Approaches to a Long Neglected Problem, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 407, 408 (1973).
8. The Developmental Disabilities Council, organized under the Department of
Human Resources, is presently engaged in an attempt to draft new guardianship statutes
for the mentally handicapped in North Carolina.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 33 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
10. Id. ch. 35, as amended, (Supp. 1974).
11. Id. ch. 122, as amended, (Supp. 1974).
12. Id. ch. IA (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
13. N.C.R. Cirv. P. 17(b).
14. The assistant clerks may also appoint guardians. In re Barker, 210 N.C. 617,
188 S.E. 205 (1936).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-1 (1966). This section also gives the clerks power to
appoint "trustees" who are subject to the laws governing guardians for "any adult person
[who] is declared incompetent in connection with his commitment to a mental hospital
[under chapter 122] or ...found to be incompetent from want of understanding to
manage his affairs by reason of physical and mental weakness on account of old age,
disease, or other like infirmities [under chapter 35] . . . ." While the term "trustee" in
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terms "idiots," "lunatics," and "inebriates" are not defined in chapter
33. Since neither a declaration of incompetency nor a certificate of
lunacy under chapter 35, nor a judicial hospitalization ordered pursuant
to chapter 122 is required for the appointment of a guardian, it is
unclear how a clerk determines who is an "idiot, lunatic, or inebriate."
Not only does chapter 33 fail to define those persons for whom a
guardian may be appointed under its provisions; but, it also neglects to
describe the qualifications of a guardian. Chapter 33 does provide,
however, that clerks must remove guardians who (1) waste the ward's
estate or convert it to their own use; (2) mismanage the estate of the
ward; (3) "neglect to educate or maintain the ward or his dependents in
a manner suitable to their degree"; (4) could not legally qualify to be
an administrator of a decedent's estate or, (5) "are likely to become
insolvent or nonresidents of North Carolina."'" It is difficult to deter-
mine whether a person who is not a resident of North Carolina may be a
guardian since the fourth and fifth conditions for removal of a guardian
are inconsistent. Section 28A-4-2 permits a nonresident to be an
administrator if he has "appointed a resident agent to accept service of
process," 17 whereas section 33-9(5) implies that a nonresident may not
serve in any event. Furthermore, section 28A-4-2 allows a resident
who has moved from the state to continue to serve as an administrator
by appointing a process agent, while section 33-9(5) requires clerks to
remove a person who is likely to become a nonresident of North
Carolina.
section 33-1 refers to guardians of persons who are subject to chapters 35 and 122, these
two chapters use the term "guardian" instead of "trustee." Id. §§ 35-2, 122-36(n).
16. Id. § 33-9.
17. Id. § 28A-4-2(4) (Supp. 1974). Id. § 28A-4-1 (6) provides that any person "of
good character not disqualified under G.S. 28A-4-2" may serve as an administrator.
Section 28A-4-2 provides that the following persons may not serve as administrators: (1)
a person under eighteen years of age; (2) a person who has been adjudged incompetent
under chapter 35 and who remains under "such disability"; (3) a convicted felon; (4) a
nonresident of this State "who has not appointed a resident agent to accept service of
process in all actions or proceedings with respect to the estate, and caused such
appointment to be filed with the court; or who is a resident of this State who has,
subsequent to appointment as a personal representative, moved from this State without
appointing such process agent"; (5) a corporation "not authorized to act as a personal
representative" in this State; (6) an alien disqualified by law; (7) a person "who has lost
his rights" pursuant to chapter 31A (which deals with acts barring property rights, e.g.,
husbands who kill their wives and thus are barred from receiving any interest in their
wives' estates); (8) an illiterate; (9) a person whom the clerk finds "unsuitable"; or,
(10) a person who has renounced his interest in the estate of the decedent. Note that
under subsection (10), one who renounces his interest in the estate of the parent of the
ward cannot thereafter serve as the guardian of the ward. Your authors can perceive no
justification for this result.
1976]
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The procedure for appointing a guardian under chapter 33 begins
with a petition for "custody and guardianship" filed with the clerk of
superior court.18 Neither the statutes nor the cases limit the persons
who may bring this petition, although in practice the petitioner is often a
relative or friend of the person alleged to need guardianship services. If
no relative of the prospective ward is present when the petition is filed,
the clerk is required to assign a day for a hearing; otherwise, he "may"
conduct a hearing "for any other good cause."1 If, however, the clerk
determines that a hearing is unnecessary, the statutes fail to provide a
procedure for him to follow in appointing a guardian. Assuming that
he decides to conduct a hearing, the clerk "notifies" those persons
"whom he may deem it proper to notify" of the hearing date; he is not
statutorily required to give notice to anyone. In the event notice is
given, however, the statutes do not require the notice to contain any
information other than the date of the hearing, nor do they require that
the petitioner have advance notice of the hearing. Therefore, these
provisions do not meet the due process requirements of adequate and
timely notice.20
At the hearing, the clerk is required to determine whether a
guardian should be named and, if so, who the guardian should be.
Instead of choosing one guardian for the general supervision of the
ward, the clerk may appoint one guardian to care for the person of the
ward and another to manage the ward's estate.21 Chapter 33 does not
require the presentation of any medical evidence at the hearing even
when guardians are appointed for "idiots, lunatics, and inebriates."
Chapter 33 does not grant the prospective ward a right of appeal
from the holding of the clerk of court: any review of the clerk's ruling
derives from the power of the judges of superior court to review matters
of probate.22  According to the North Carolina Supreme Court, "the
clerk 'performs duties pertaining to judges of probate' "23 whenever he
18. Id. § 33-7 (1966).
19. Id.
20. The due process requirements of adequate and timely notice are discussed in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The Court stated:
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding . . . is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action. . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance. . ." Id. at 315.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-6 (1966).
22. In re Simmons, 266 N.C. 702, 707, 147 S.E.2d 231, 237 (1966). Apparently




appoints or removes guardians. Significantly, the clerk's findings of
fact are not subject to challenge; thus any review of the clerk's order is
limited to a consideration of his compliance with the few procedural
requirements of the the statutes.24
In addition to establishing a procedure for the appointment of a
guardian by the clerk of court, chapter 33 provides an alternative
method by which a guardian may be appointed for a minor. Section
33-2 states that the father may, by will, appoint a guardian to serve
upon the death of both parents, for any unmarried minor children who,
at the father's death, are either born or are "in ventre sa mere." 25
Chapter 33 also provides that if the father is dead and has not exercised
his power of appointment or if he has abandoned his wife, the mother
may appoint a guardian in her will. 26
Both a testamentary 27 and a clerk-appointed guardian of a minor
may serve only until the ward becomes eighteen years of age. In re
Simmons" involved a guardian of a mentally retarded child who con-
tinued to serve as guardian after the child reached his majority. Be-
cause the guardian was appointed on the basis of the child's minori-
ty, rather than the child's mental retardation, the court held that the
authority of the guardian ended when the child came of age. Since
parents can testamentarily appoint guardians only on the basis of their
childrens' minority,29 Simmons prevents the parents of a mentally re-
tarded child from appointing a testamentary guardian who may serve
after the child becomes an adult. In order to avoid this problem,
parents of mentally handicapped children often use trust agreements
designating as trustee the person they want to serve as a guardian. 30
These agreements, however, can only grant a trustee control over the
estate of the ward;31 thus, if the trustee needs power over the person of
the ward (to authorize medical treatment, for example), the trustee
must resort to court proceedings to be appointed the legal guardian of
the ward.
24. In re Michal, 273 N.C. 504, 507, 160 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1968); In re Simmons,
266 N.C. 702, 147 S.E.2d 231 (1966). But see, In re Lowther, 271 N.C. 346, 156 S.E.2d
693 (1967).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-2 (Supp. 1974).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In re Simmons, 256 N.C. 184, 123 S.E.2d 614 (1962).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-2 (Supp. 1974).
30. Hodgson, supra note 7, at 424.
31. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 36 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974),
which defines the various permissible activities of trustees.
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If the parents of a child die without appointing a guardian, chapter
33 provides that the director of public welfare will be appointed to serve
as guardian of the person of any child who requires services from the
department of public welfare until such time as a private guardian can
be appointed."2 Chapter 33 does not state who has the obligation to
serve as guardian of abandoned adults in need of guardianship services.
Section 33-20 provides that "[e]very guardian shall take posses-
sion" of all of his ward's estate,33 but, the guardian must post a bond as
security before receiving the property of his ward. 4 The amount of the
bond is statutorily determined according to the value of the estate of the
ward.35 Chapter 33 does not state the amount of the bond when there
is no estate, but in such circumstances, the clerks of court commonly
require a 1,000 dollar bond. 6 If the clerk does not require a bond, or
if 1,000 dollars is inadequate, the resources of the guardian may not be
sufficient to compensate the ward for an injury to his person inflicted by
the guardian. A possible justification for this omission in the statutes is
that, if a bond were required from the guardians of wards having no
estates, it might be difficult to find persons willing to serve as guardians.
Unlike guardians of wards who have estates, these guardians receive no
compensation for their services since compensation, if any, is awarded
from the ward's estate. 7
Sections 33-12 through 33-77 define the guardian's powers over the
estate of his ward. Briefly, the guardian has plenary power over his
ward's estate, subject only to certain fiduciary duties and, in some
instances, the approval of the clerk of court or the judge of the district or
superior court.38 The guardian's only responsibility with respect to the
32. Id. § 33-1.1 (1966). This agency has been replaced by the Department of
Social Services. See M. THOMAS, A GUIDE TO SOCIAL SERVICES IN NORTH CAROLINA 5
(1975).
33. The statute's reference to "every guardian" is certainly incorrect where guardi-
ans of the "person" are concerned. According to N.C. Gen. STAT. § 33-6 (1966), the
guardian of the person receives only "yearly sums of money . . . for the support and
education of the orphan, or for the maintenance of the idiot, lunatic or inebriate . .. ."
Apparently the guardian of the person can receive no monies for the education of a
mentally retarded adult.
34. See generally id. ch. 33, art. 2, as amended, (Supp. 1974).
35. Id. §§ 33-13,-15 (1966).
36. Conversation with Frank Frederick, Clerk of Superior Court of Orange Coun-
ty, in Hillsborough, N.C., May 12, 1975.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-43 (1966).
38. It is unclear why a rental or lease of the ward's lands must be approved by the
clerk of superior court, id. § 33-21, when the "enlargement" of the guardian's powers to
cultivate the land of the ward or to "continue" the ward's business must be approved by
the district court judge. Id. § 33-24. Furthermore a sale of the ward's lands must be
approved by the judge of the superior court. Id. § 33-31.
[Vol. 54
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"person" of his ward is to "educate and maintain" the ward and the
ward's dependents in a "manner suitable to their degree. '3 9  Although
the North Carolina Supreme Court criticized one guardian for failing to
visit his hospitalized ward,40 North Carolina case law has not otherwise
defined a guardian's authority over and responsibilities to the "person" of
his ward.
Chapter 35
Chapter 35 establishes the judicial procedure whereby a person
may be declared incompetent and provides that when a person is found
to be incompetent, the clerk must appoint a guardian for him.41  Since
chapter 35 does not require a public agency to assume the guardianship
functions if no individual is willing to serve as a guardian of the
incompetent person, it is unclear how a clerk is to fulfill his statutory
obligation to appoint a guardian when no one is willing to assume this
responsibility.
Section 35-2 provides that any "mentally defective," "mentally
disordered," "inebriate," or "incompetent" person may be adjudicated
incompetent; and, unlike chapter 33, chapter 35 defines the terms used
to refer to those persons.42 Irrespective of the term used to define the
39. Id. § 33-9(3).
40. In re Simmons, 266 N.C. 702, 706, 147 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1966).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1974).
42. Id. § 35-1 defines an "inebriate" as "[alny person who habitually, whether
continuously or periodically, indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors, narcotics or
drugs to such an extent as to stupify his mind and to render him incompetent to transact
ordinary business with safety to his estate, or who renders himself, by reason of the use
of intoxicating liquors, narcotics or drugs, dangerous to person or property, or who, by
the frequent use of liquor, narcotics or drugs, renders himself cruel and intolerable to his
family, or fails from such cause to provide his family with reasonable necessities of
life. . . . [P]rovided, the habit of so indulging in such use is at the time of inquisition
of at least one year's standing." Apparently, the family of the "addict" must suffer along
as best it can during the first year of the addiction. Id. § 35-1.1 (enacted in 1945)
defines "mental disease," "mental disorder" and "mental illness" as "an illness which so
lessens the capacity of the person to use his customary self-control, judgment, and
discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or
advisable for him to be under treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control. The
terms shall be construed to include 'lunacy,' 'unsoundness of mind,' and 'insanity.'"
Section 35-1.1 continues by defining "mental defective" as "a person who is not mentally
ill but whose mental development is so retarded that he has not acquired enough self-
control, judgment, and discretion to manage himself and his affairs, and for whose own
welfare or that of others, supervision, guidance, care, or control is necessary or advisable.
The term shall be construed to include 'feebleminded,' 'idiot,' and 'imbecile." Al-
though the 1945 amendment to chapter 35 attempts to replace the old pejorative language
with modem terms, the legislators did not bother to remove the old language from the
statutes and it still appears in the court proceedings and other provisions of the General
Statutes. See, e.g., id. ch. 33.
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person's mental inadequacy, the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled
that before a person can be declared incompetent under chapter 35,
there must be a finding that the person lacks "understanding to manage
his affairs."" In Hagins v. Redevelopment Commission the court held
that "it is not enough to show that another might manage a man's
property more wisely" or that the alleged incompetent was merely
eccentric or held "particular beliefs."" Rather, the alleged incompetent
must be "incapable of transacting the ordinary business involved in
taking care of his property, . . . [and] incapable of exercising rational
judgment and weighing the consequences of his acts upon himself, his
family, his property and estate . . . ." Furthermore, the court has
stated that this inadequacy must affect the person's "entire property and
business-not just one transaction or one piece of property."40  Al-
though Hagins thus demands an evaluation of the mental capacity of a
person, it does not require that medical evidence be presented to aid in
the determination of mental incapacity.
Upon a determination of incompetency, the clerk names a guardian
for the incompetent. 41  Guardians appointed under chapter 35 are
"vested with all the powers of a guardian administering an estate for any
person and shall be subject to all the laws governing the administration
of estates of minors and incompetents."4 Both chapter 33 and chapter
35 fail to provide who may serve as a guardian; unlike chapter 33,
however, chapter 35 does not contain grounds for removal of a guardi-
an. Arguably, the grounds set forth in chapter 33 apply also to the
removal of guardians appointed under chapter 35.
The chapter 35 procedure for an adjudication of incompetency
differs from the procedure for appointing a guardian in chapter 33. The
incompetency proceeding begins when a petition is filed with the clerk
of superior court requesting that the prospective ward be declared
incompetent.49  The statute permits anyone to file this petition, but it
does not designate a public official legally responsible for doing so.
Because a petitioner would be liable for malicious prosecution if a court
found that the petition was filed in bad faith,50 a private individual
43. Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 104, 165 S.E.2d 490, 499
(1969).
44. Id. at 105-06, 165 S.E.2d at 500.
45. Id. at 106, 165 S.E.2d at 500.
46. Id. at 104, 165 S.E.2d at 499.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (1966).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The elements of malicious prosecution were set out in Fowle v. Fowle, 263
396 [Vol. 54
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might be reluctant to file the petition. As a result, many mentally
handicapped persons are never declared incompetent and consequently
never receive the protection of a guardian. 51
The petition required by section 35-2 must "set forth the facts"
leading to the petition and must be verified by the oath of the petitioner.
Although the statute does not specify the "facts" to be "set forth," the
petition generally will contain allegations of all evidence tending to show
that the prospective ward is incompetent.52 Often, otherwise confiden-
tial results of a physician's examination are found in these petitions,
making this information available for public inspection at the clerk's
office.
Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk is required to "notify" the
alleged incompetent. 5 As in chapter 33, the statutes specify neither the
contents of the notice nor the time within which notice must be deliv-
ered. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "it would be
prudent" to provide "such notice as will give information of the pro-
posed action in ample time [for the alleged incompetent] to be present";
yet, a clerk's failure to give such notice does not constitute grounds
for overturning an adjudication of incompetency.54
Also, as in chapter 33, the clerk of court conducts the hearing.
However, unlike chapter 33, chapter 35 provides for a jury of twelve
men, and it is the jury, not the clerk, which determines the mental
capacity of the alleged incompetent. 55 There is no requirement that the
alleged incompetent be present at the hearing, be represented by an
attorney, or have the right to present evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses, notwithstanding the fact that many civil rights and privileges are
lost to a person who has been declared incompetent. The person
N.C. 724, 140 S.E.2d 398 (1965) where a husband conspired with two of his friends
(who were physicians) and had his wife committed to an insane asylum in order to "get
rid" of her. (The husband finally obtained a divorce and remarried.) The court
required three elements: (1) malice; (2) want of probable cause; and (3) the com-
mencement and prosecution of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff. Id. at 729, 140
S.E.2d at 402. It was held that the wife's successful use of the habeas corpus proceeding
to be released from the insane asylum satisfied the third requirement. Id. at 729, 140
S.E.2d at 401.
51. For a discussion of this problem in another context, see NATIONAL CoUNciL ON
AGING, THE LAw AND THE IMPAIRED OLDER PERSON: PROTECTION OR PUNISHMENT?
(1966).
52. Discussion with Frank Frederick, Clerk of Superior Court of Orange County,
in Hillsborough, N.C., May 12, 1975.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1974).
54. In re Propst, 144 N.C. 562, 566, 57 S.E. 342, 343 (1907).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (Supp. 1974).
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declared incompetent cannot marry,56 execute or revoke a will, 7 or
serve on a jury.58 Moreover, few persons will contract with someone
who has been adjudicated incompetent because all agreements executed
by persons deemed incompetent to contract are voidable at the option of
the incompetent party59 and an adjudication of incompetency under
chapter 35 is presumptive evidence of incapacity to contract. e0 Finally,
the Department of Motor Vehicles may revoke the driver's license of any
person who has been adjudicated incompetent.6 '
Furthermore, the drawbacks of chapter 35 proceedings often pre-
clude its use by relatives or friends who may want to be declared
guardians of a mentally handicapped person. Many people object to
the contents of the notice given to the alleged incompetent. The notice
usually follows the statutory language, stating: "You are hereby notified
that (X) has filed a petition before the - Court of - County alleging
that you are incompetent from want of understanding to manage your
affairs. ... "62 This notice would be devastating to a person who is
56. Id. § 51-3 (1966) provides that all marriages between persons, either of whom
is "incapable of contracting from want of will or understanding, shall be void .... "
57. Id. § 31-1 (Supp. 1974); In re Will of Shute, 251 N.C. 697, 111 S.E.2d 851
(1960).
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (Supp. 1974). Until 1974 persons who had been
adjudicated mentally incompetent could not vote in North Carolina, but this restriction
has been deleted. See id. § 163-55. A New Jersey court has held that it is unconstitu-
tional for a state to deprive residents of a school for the mentally retarded of the right to
vote. Carroll v. Cobb, Civil No. L-6585-74-P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct., November 1974),
cited in, HEW, MENTrA. RETARDATOnN AND THE LAW 31 (June 1975).
59. Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966). Note also
that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1969) (the "dead man's" statute) provides that an
interested party cannot be a witness in his own behalf against the "committee of a
lunatic" unless the lunatic also testifies. Thus, one who contracts with a "lunatic" may
not be able to testify in court proceedings as to the contents of that contract. Note, too,
that since section 8-51 uses the term "lunatic" and since chapter 35 apparently defines
"lunatic" as a mentally "ill" person and not a mentally "retarded" person, id. § 35-1.1,
section 8-51 does not apply to people who contract with mentally retarded persons.
Furthermore, neither section 8-51 nor chapter 35 defines the term "committee" of a
lunatic.
60. Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966). See text
accompanying note 65 infra.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17.1(a) (1975) provides that the Commissioner of the
Department of Motor Vehicles "upon receipt of notice that any person has been legally
adjudicated incompetent or has been involuntarily admitted to an institution for the
treatment of alcoholism or drug addiction, shall forthwith make inquiry into the facts for
the purpose of determining whether such person is competent to operate a motor vehicle.
Unless the Commissioner is satisfied that such person is competent to operate a motor
vehicle with safety to persons and property, he shall revoke such person's driving
privilege." Id. § 20-17.1 also provides for a hearing if the incompetent requests one in
writing.
62. Conversation with Frank Frederick, Clerk of Superior Court of Orange Coun-
ty, in Hillsborough, N.C., May 12, 1975.
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able to understand its meaning. In addition, a jury trial may prove
embarrassing, especially in small communities where the jurors are likely
to be friends and neighbors of the alleged incompetent. Finally, al-
though a mentally handicapped person may need only limited restraints,
the adjudication of incompetency unnecessarily results in a substantial
loss of civil rights.63
In view of these factors, one may wonder why chapter 35 proceed-
ings are ever brought. Typically, two reasons are advanced for their
use. First, an incompetent person may be unable to manage his estate
and could be tricked into agreements that are to his disadvantage. 64
Petitioners seek the adjudication of incompetency in order to safeguard
the incompetent's property by preventing him from entering into such
agreements. While it is true that an adjudication of incompetency will
discourage many persons from contracting with the incompetent person,
the adjudication is not conclusive evidence on the question of competen-
cy to contract. In Medical College of Virginia v. Maynard6  a man who
had been declared incompetent signed a contract that was not in the best
interests of his estate. His wife sought to have the agreement nullified
on the ground of her husband's incapacity to contract. The court held
that parties to the contract who were not also parties to the incompeten-
cy proceedings are not bound by the adjudication of incompetency. The
implications of Maynard are that whenever a person who has been
declared incompetent enters into an agreement, the issue of competency
may have to be relitigated and the chapter 35 proceeding will offer little
protection to the ward.
The second reason for initiating chapter 35 proceedings is to
enable a guardian to control the person or estate of the ward.66 For
example, a hospital may require a patient's consent before it will allow
its doctors to provide certain types of medical treatment. If the doctors
have actual notice that the patient is incompetent, his consent is voida-
ble; therefore, the consent of someone who is legally responsible for the
patient is required.
It is not necessary, however, to undergo the trauma of a chapter 35
proceeding in order to control the person or estate of an incompetent. A
guardian appointed pursuant to chapter 35 is not the only person who
63. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
64. For a discussion of this problem, see Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275
N.C. 90, 103, 165 S.E.2d 490, 499 (1969).
65. 236 N.C. 506,73 S.E.2d 315 (1952).
66. Conversation with Frank Frederick, Clerk of Superior Court of Orange Coun-
ty, in -illsborough, N.C., May 12, 1975.
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can assume the legal responsibility for an incompetent: a guardian
appointed under chapter 33 or a person named as the incompetent's
attorney in fact by a power of attorney has the same authority as that of
the chapter 35 guardian.
The power of attorney is preferable to either the chapter 33 or the
chapter 35 guardian because the attorney in fact can be given all of the
powers granted to these guardians6 7 without having all of their responsi-
bilities. An attorney in fact is not required to post a bond before
acquiring the property of the grantor of the power. Also, while guardi-
ans appointed pursuant to chapters 33 and 35 must make several
accountings to the clerk of court, such accountings by an attorney in fact
may be dispensed with if the power of attorney so provides. 8 Further-
more, the power of attorney is drafted in the privacy of a lawyer's office
and neither a chapter 33 proceeding nor a chapter 35 jury trial is
required. Although the power of attorney is filed in the office of the
register of deeds and is a matter of public record, 6 it does not contain
the results of a physician's examination nor does it imply that the
grantor is incompetent. Finally, unlike an adjudication of incompeten-
cy, the execution of a power of attorney does not cause the grantor to
forfeit any civil rights.
There are, however, two disadvantages to the power of attorney. A
power of attorney is valid only when the grantor of the power is
competent to contract, 70 and any person who can prove that the grantor
was incompetent when the power was executed can cause the power to
be invalidated. Second, it may be unethical for a lawyer to draft a
power of attorney knowing that the grantor is mentally incompetent to
execute the instrument. The Disciplinary Rules of the American Bar
Association prohibit a lawyer fron intentionally misrepresenting any
"matter of fact or law"'m to the court. Drafting a power of attorney
could be viewed as a representation to the court that the grantor is
competent to execute the document-a representation that the lawyer
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-115.1(i) (1966) states that a power of attorney may
contain any provisions, "not unlawful" relating to the "rights, powers, duties and
responsibilities of the attorney in fact." Of course, the statutes do not disclose what
provisions would be considered "unlawful."
68. Id. § 47-115.1(h).
69. Id. § 47-115.1(d) (Supp. 1974).
70. Id. § 47-115.1 (a).
71. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO ThE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD 1.1(d) (1971). For
corresponding sections in the North Carolina Code, see NORTH CAROLINA DISCIPLINARY
RULE 7-102(A)(6) (1974) which states that a lawyer shall not "[p]articipate in the
creation or preservation of evidence when he knows ... that the evidence is false,"
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knows is not true. In spite of these two drawbacks, the power of
attorney offers the only alternative to a declaration of incompetency
under chapter 35 or a guardianship proceeding under chapter 33, and
many lawyers use the power of attorney to avoid subjecting their client
to either of these statutory proceedings..
Chapter 35 also provides that a guardian may be appointed when a
certificate of lunacy has been issued stating that the prospective ward is
a "lunatic. 72 The certificate, which has the same effect as the adjudi-
cation of incompetency, 73 may be issued by the superintendent of any
governmentally operated 74 insane asylum or training school located in
any state or territory or in Washington, D.C. It may also be issued by
the superintendent of any licensed hospital in North Carolina. The
person certified to be a "lunatic" must be "confined" in the institution at
the time of issuance, but neither the statutes nor the cases define the
term "confined." Moreover, the statutes do not require that the person
be confined in the hospital because of a mental handicap. Conceivably,
any person who is hospitalized for any purpose, e.g., a tonsillectomy, is
not immune from the issuance of a certificate of lunacy. Chapter 35
does not require that anyone be given notice of the superintendent's
intention to issue a certificate or of the fact that a certificate has been
issued. There is no hearing, no right to counsel, and no provision for
appeal if the certificate is issued.
Once a certificate of lunacy has been issued with respect to a
person who is a patient of a hospital (even if the person voluntarily
admitted himself), the person may not leave the hospital of his own
volition; indeed, he can be discharged only if the director of the hospital
decides to release him or if a court orders his discharge pursuant to a
habeas corpus proceeding.7 ' Furthermore, since there are no require-
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-3 (1966).
73. See, id. § 35-3.
74. Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921) reiterates that these
superintendents must be employed by governmentally operated institutions.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-137 (1966) gives the power to discharge patients to the
superintendent of the hospital involved. If the patient is adjudicated to be mentally
incompetent or is the subject of a certificate of "lunacy," he is not competent to sign
discharge papers where required. -See text accompanying note 60 supra. See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-58.13 (Supp. 1974) addressing administrators of mental institutions for
the "insane" and, id. § 122-71.1, addressing administrators of mental institutions for the
"retarded." For a case authorizing the use of the habeas corpus remedy in instances
where the petitioner is admitted to a mental institution under chapter 122, see In re
Harris, 241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954). Supposedly the habeas corpus remedy
would be available for any patient held against his will in a hospital of any kind. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 17-3 (1974) provides that the writ is available to "[e]very person imprisoned
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ments that a guardian be appointed for a patient for whom a certificate
has been issued, and since the patient himself may be unaware of his
legal remedies, the habeas corpus option could be illusory. Thus, a
person could, without any due process protections, be confined in a
mental institution until the hospital director decides to release him.
Chapter 122
Chapter 122 provides for judicial hospitalization of mentally disa-
bled persons. The chapter can conveniently be treated as consisting of
three sections. The first defines the rights of the patients in mental
institutions;7" the second provides a procedure for admitting mentally ill
persons to mental institutions;77 and the third deals with the admission
of mentally retarded persons to mental retardation treatment centers. 78
The first and third sections also specify the duties of guardians of
mentally disabled persons who are subject to the provisions of chapter
122.
The first section, defining patients' rights, contains two parts: one
addressing adult patients,79 and the other, minor patients.80 Each part
enumerates the civil rights of patients of North Carolina's institutions
and hospitals, including the right to communicate with their legal coun-
sel. No right of adult patients may be "limited or restricted" unless the
next of kin or guardian is given written notice of the restriction
and of the "reason therefor."' Furthermore, section 122-55.6 of the
or restrained of his liberty within this State, for any criminal or supposed criminal
matter, or on any pretense whatsoever . . ." (emphasis added).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-1 to -35.27 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1974) deal
only with the organization and management of the hospitals so they are not spoken to in
this comment. Id. §§ 122-36 to -55.7 (1974), in particular sections 122-55.1 to -55.7
address patients' rights. For a discussion of the constitutionality of chapter 122, see
Comment, 52 N.C.L. REV., supra note 6.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-56.1 to -65.9 (1974).
78. Id. §§ 122-69to-71.3.
79. Id. §§ 122-55.1 to -55.7.
80. Id. §§ 122-55.13 to -55.14 (Supp. 1974).
81. Id. § 122-55.2(d) (1974). This section also pravides that, "(n]o right enumer-
ated in subsection (b) above may be limited or restricted without a written statement in
the patient's treatment or habilitation plan which indicates the detailed reason for
such a restriction or limitation. No restriction of rights shall be made except
by mental health or mental retardation professionals responsible for the formulation of
the patient's treatment or habilitation plan." These restrictions are valid only for sixty
days and after that time they must be reviewed. The treatment plan referred to is
defined in id. § 122-36(j) as "the individual plan of treatment to be undertaken by the
treatment facility for a patient's restoration to health." Id. § 122-55.14(c) (Supp. 1974)
is the provision which mirrors section 122-55.2(d) and applies to minor patients.
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General Statutes, which grants all patients a "right to treatment,"
provides that the consent of the patient if competent, otherwise of the
guardian, must first be obtained before electroshock treatment, the ad-
ministration of certain drugs, and any surgery other than "emergency
surgery" may legally be performed on the ward."2
The third section, which deals with the admission of mentally
retarded persons to mental retardation treatment centers, states that a
person may be admitted to an institution for treatment of mental retar-
dation upon the application of his parents or guardian. 3  Although
chapter 122 grants several due process protections to persons involun-
tarily committed to hospitals for the mentally ill, 4 it grants no protec-
tions to persons admitted on application of their guardians or parents to
mental retardation treatment centers. The only requirement for admis-
sion to these treatment centers is that the application for admission be
signed by the parent or guardian of the person alleged to be mentally
retarded. This statute results in the "warehousing" of children and
wards who are not wanted by their parents and guardians.8 5
Chapter 1A
Chapter 1A (the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure) pro-
vides that whenever the plaintiff or defendant in a civil action is an
incompetent person who does not have a guardian or a guardian ad
litem, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the person
in the litigation. 6 The distinction between a guardian and a guardian
ad litem is that the guardian ad litem is an attorney who represents the
ward during the litigation; his powers and duties terminate when the suit
is ended.8 7  The ad litem provisions of chapter 1A do not, however,
apply to chapters 33, 35 and 122 (which do not provide for the
protection of the right to counsel), since chapter 1A states that its
provisions are not controlling when a "procedure" different from that
established therein is statutorily provided.88
82. Id. § 122-55.6 (1974).
83. Id. § 122-70.
84. See Comment, 52 N.C.L. REV., supra note 6.
85. For examples of this type of warehousing of people see, Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af!'d in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part sub
nor. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
86. N.C.R. Civ. P. 17(b).
87. Hagins v. Redevelopment Comnm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 101, 165 S.E.2d 490, 497
(1969).
88. N.C.R. Crv. P. 1 provides "[t]hese rules shall govern the procedure in the
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The provisions of chapter IA apply to "infant, insane, or incompe-
tent" persons.8 9 As in chapter 33, these terms are not defined, and
chapter IA is not limited in its coverage to persons who have been
declared incompetent under chapter 35 or judicially .hospitalized under
chapter 122.90
The ad litem proceedings may be initiated by either a friend or a
relative of the incompetent by any party to the litigation, or by the judge
presiding over the civil action or special proceeding in which the incom-
petent is a plaintiff or defendant. The friend or relative is permitted to
file a written application requesting the appointment of a guardian or
a guardian ad litem. The statutes do not specify the contents of the
application nor do they state with whom the application must be filed.
If a judge, on his own motion, takes notice of the fact that the plaintiff
or defendant is incompetent, he may appoint a guardian or guardian ad
litem for that person. In Hagins v. Redevelopment Commission"1 the
trial judge took notice of the fact that the plaintiff was incompetent and
appointed a next friend 2 for her. The plaintiff received no notice of
the impending appointment and there was no judicial determination of
her mental capacity. The supreme court invalidated the appointment,
stating that if a person's mental capacity is questioned and the person has
not previously been adjudicated incompetent, that person is entitled to
notice of the application or court-proposed action and an opportunity to
be heard before a guardian ad litem may be appointed. Thus, under the
Hagins doctrine, if a person files an application alleging that a plaintiff
or defendant in a civil suit is mentally incompetent, or if a judge takes
notice that the person may need a guardian ad litem, the alleged incom-
petent must be notified and given an opportunity to be heard before the
guardian ad litem may be appointed. The notice must be "as in the case
of an inquisition of lunacy under chapter 35.'' 3 As pointed out earlier,
chapter 35 does not define the contents of the notice referred to under
its provisions, nor has case law addressed the issue. The court in Hagins
did state, however, that the notice required by its holding must be served
superior and district courts . . . except when a differing procedure is prescribed by
statute."
89. Id. 17(b) addresses "infants and incompetents" while Rule 17(c) addresses
"infants, insane or incompetent" persons. The discrepancy is inexplicable.
90. Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969).
91. Id.
92. The 1974 version of Rule 17 makes no reference to a next friend and only
guardians ad litem may now be appointed.




ten days prior to the guardianship proceeding;94 the notice apparently is
required to be timely, if not adequate. If, at the hearing, the alleged
incompetent objects to the appointment of a guardian ad litem, chapter
35 proceedings are initiated to determine the person's competence.
The due process protections mandated by Hagins will in all likeli-
hood be judicially extended to proceedings under chapters 33, 35, and
122. In Hagins the court held that the due process protections were
necessary to safeguard the plaintiff's right to retain a lawyer of her
choice, to conduct her litigation, and to settle her case on terms that she
would find acceptable. 95 The rights at stake in chapters 33, 35, and
122 are at least as worthy of protection as those described in Hagins.
Summary
Many of the North Carolina statutes dealing with guardianship are
clearly unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds. For exam-
ple, chapter 33 does not require the clerk to notify a potential ward of
the petition for guardianship nor to conduct a hearing prior to the
appointment of a guardian. Similarly, section 35-3 grants no due
process protection with regard to the issuance of certificates of lunacy.
Chapter 122 provides no due process protection before a person may be
committed to an institution for the mentally retarded, and chapter IA
does not provide for adequate notice before the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
The present statutes not only have constitutional defects, but many
other infirmities as well. One major fault is their terminology. The
words used by the statutes to refer to persons in need of a guardian are
not only pejorative but are also confusing. Such crude terms as "idiots,"
"imbecile" and "lunatic" permeate the statutes; 0 furthermore, only
chapters 35 and 122 define the terms used. Moreover, when undefined
terms are employed, they are not used consistently; thus, their meaning
cannot be determined from the context in which they appear. For
example, "ward" in section 33-30 apparently means any person for
whom a guardian has been designated; whereas in section 33-26,
94. Id. However, Rule 6(d), upon which the court relied to arrive at its ten-day
figure, has been amended to provide for a five-day notice requirement. This five-day
requirement has been noted by the court of appeals in Rutledge v. Rutledge, 10 N.C.
App. 427, 179 S.E.2d 163 (1971).
95. Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 102, 165 S.E.2d 490, 498
(1969).
96. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-1 (1966).
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"ward" refers only to a minor for whom a guardian has been chosen.
The following terms also appear in the statutes and cases, usually
without definition: "non compos mentis,"' 7 "insane, '" , "incompe-
tent,"9 9 "unsoundness of mind," 00 "feeble-minded,"'' "mentally re-
tarded," 102 "mentally sick,"'1 3 "mentally ill,"1104 "mentally diseased,"'' 0
"mental defective,"'0 and "mental disorder."'0'0
A second flaw is the lack of a statutory provision whereby a parent
may provide in his will for the appointment of a guardian to serve when
a mentally retarded son or daughter reaches majority. Thus, another
guardianship proceeding must be held when the ward attains the age of
eighteen.
In addition, there are no provisions restricting or defining a guard-
ian's powers over the person of his ward. All of the statutes in chapter
33, save one, apply only to the control of the ward's estate. Conse-
quently, a guardian may exercise plenary control over the person of his
ward when only minimal control is desirable. Also, because of the
present bonding provisions, a ward who possesses no estate might never
be compensated for an injury inflicted by his guardian. Further, many of
the civil rights of a person who has been adjudicated incompetent are
restricted, in spite of the fact that the person may be capabla of
exercising these rights. Thus, the adjudication provisions of the Gener-
al Statutes often unnecessarily withdraw certain rights from persons
subject to guardianship orders and often fail to provide the means to
protect the wards of "overreaching" guardians.
The procedures of chapters 33 and 35 are inadequate in other
respects, as well. For example, no one is responsible for initiating
guardianship procedures, and, in view of possible civil liability for doing
so, interested persons may be reluctant to petition for the appointment of
a guardian for an individual who desperately needs one. No provision
in chapters 33, 35 or 1A requires that any medical evidence be pre-
sented prior to a finding of incompetency. .Finally, if a private indi-
97. Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2.1 (1966).
99. Id. § 35-1.
100. Id. § 35-1.1.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 122-69 (1974).
103. Id. § 122-92.






vidual cannot be found to serve as a guardian, there is no provision for
a public or private agency to assume guardianship responsibility for
handicapped adults.
Other states have resolved the problems evident in the North
Carolina statutes. They have responded in many different ways to
correct the inadequacies in their statutes: some of their solutions may be
instructive to North Carolina lawmakers.
RECENT STATE STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
ON GUARDIANSHIP
The recent experiences of various state legislatures, as well as
guidelines from other authorities, provide valuable insights and possible
solutions to the complex problems involved in the formulation of an
effective system of guardianship. This survey of current trends in state
legislation and information from other authoritative sources will consid-
er: (1) the questions involving potential wards, (2) the problems
concerning prospective guardians, and (3) the role of courts in guardi-
anship proceedings.
Considerations Involving Potential Wards
The first question to be considered in developing an improved
system of guardianship law is for whom should a guardian be provided.
The policy statement on guardianship issued by the American Associa-
tion on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) defines a person in need of a
guardian as one "who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic intoxica-
tion, or other cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsi-
ble decisions concerning his person."'1 8 Although this definition covers
both the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, the policy statement
addresses itself almost exclusively to the mentally retarded. °9 Thus, it
is difficult to determine whom the AAMD would include as potential
wards in a guardianship program. Nevertheless, the AAMD would no
108. "Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons," an official AAMD policy state-
ment published in the April, 1975, issue of MENTAL RETARDATION, at C-5. This policy
statement was approved by the AAMD Council in March, 1975.
109. The title of the statement itself is "Guardianship for Mentally Retarded
Persons," and the statement is clearly directed toward persons "whose incompetence is
due to mental retardation" because such persons "have certain characteristics which tend
to differentiate them from persons who become senile or suffer an episode of mental
illness." Id.
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doubt endorse a system that provides guardians for both mentally ill and
mentally retarded persons, as well as persons suffering from the other
disabilities it enumerates, as long as the "special needs of retarded
persons" are taken into account.110
Several state legislatures have recently enacted guardianship stat-
utes which deal exclusively with mentally "retarded" or "deficient"
persons. Article 17A of New York's Surrogate's Court Procedure Act
establishes a procedure for the appointment of guardians for the mental-
ly retarded.111 The Article was enacted at the request of the Joint
Legislative Committee on Mental and Physical Handicap in order to
avoid the situation in which a guardian, appointed during the minority
of a mentally retarded person, loses his authority to act upon the child's
reaching majority. 1 2 New Jersey,' West Virginia'1 4 and Louisiana 15
have also recently enacted guardianship statutes that are designed solely
to benefit the mentally retarded person.
Maine represents a jurisdiction that has two separate statutes, one
providing guardians for mentally retarded persons and the other for
those who are mentally ill." 0 Usually, such a statutory scheme results
from the existence of two distinct departments within state government,
providing services to the mentally ill and to the mentally retarded. 17
A statute designed to provide guardians for the mentally retarded
must identify the persons who fall within that category. The Develop-
mental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act of 197018
provides the broadest definition of who should be considered mentally
retarded." 9 The Act uses the term "developmental disabilities," which
it defines as mental retardation and other neurological conditions "close-
ly related to mental retardation or [requiring] treatment similar to that
required for most mentally retarded individuals."' 2 1' While this defini-
tion has the advantage of defining potential wards in terms of the
110. Id.
111. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. §§ 1750-55 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
112. A. Lipman, "Practice Commentary," printed in id. § 1750.
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.1 (Supp. 1974).
114. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-IOA-1 to -5 (Supp. 1975).
115. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 336-40, 354-62 (West Supp. 1975).
116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3621 to -37, 3638 to -50-E (Supp. 1975).
117. E.g., in Maine, guardianship of the mentally retarded is under the Bureau of
Mental Retardation (id. §§ 3621-37), whereas guardianship of incapacitated adults is
under the Department of Health and Welfare (id. §§ 3638 to -50-E).
118. Pub. L. No. 91-517, Title II, 84 Stat. 1325 (1970). See also 36 Fed. Reg.
25084 (1971).
119. OHIo REV. CODEANN. § 5119.85(A) (Page Supp. 1975).
120. 37 Fed. Reg. 18425 (1972).
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services they require, its suggestion of such broad application of guardi-
anship protection has not been received without criticism. The Act's
definition has been viewed as logically including persons suffering from
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and, by analogy, even deafness, blindness, or
other physical handicaps.12' Indeed, in adapting this definition of the
developmentally disabled to its statutory scheme, Ohio extended the
coverage of its guardianship laws to persons afflicted by cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, and "other neurological conditions.' 1 2
Thus, various states have devised guardianship provisions that
cover several categories of disabled persons, including the mentally
retarded, the elderly, and others without capacity to make responsible
decisions for themselves. In establishing broad guardianship coverage,
however, state legislatures will want to assure that the different needs of
each group are accommodated adequately.
Related to the question of which persons are to be provided
guardians is the problem of choosing appropriate terms to be used in
describing these persons. Such words as "imbeciles," "idiots," "mental-
ly defective," "incompetents," "lunatics," "feebleminded," and "persons
of unsound mind," found in North Carolina's present statutes, 123 are not
only pejorative but are also too vague to convey an accurate idea of the
meaning intended. Moreover, the social stigma involved in the oral and
written publication of such terms in court proceedings and documents
tends to discourage the use of the existing guardianship procedures in
North Carolina altogether.2 4 Several recent statutes in other states are
addressed to the "mentally retarded,' '1 25 but equally common are the
terms "developmentally disabled,"' 20 "mentally ill,'127 "mentally defi-
cient,"'28 or "incapacitated."' 20  In selecting the proper statutory termi-
nology for guardianship provisions, the most important considerations
are that the words chosen be socially neutral in connotation, descriptive-
ly accurate, and clearly distinguishable from other terms of legal signifi-
cance so as to avoid any possible confusion.' 3
121. Hodgson, supra note 7, at 418-20.
122. Id. at 417.
123. See notes 97-107 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
125. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. fit. 18, § 3623 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Sunr. Cr. PRO. §§
1751-55 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
126. Hodgson, supra note 7.
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.7 (Supp. 1975).
128. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
129. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3640 (Supp. 1975).
130. E.g., Louisiana's statutes refer to "tutorships" and speak of "trustees" instead of
guardians, which might cause confusion in a variety of different situations. LA. Crv.
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Considerations Involving Prospective Guardians
Before considering what powers are to be vested in guardians and
which persons are to fulfill the role of guardians, lawmakers must
determine what the ultimate goal of the guardianship legislation is to be.
The AAMD policy statement makes the following declaration as its first
principle: "Since. . .guardianship necessarily denies an individual the
right to exercise freely certain personal liberties, every effort should be
made through the use of social counseling services to prevent the need
for appointment of a guardian . . .... "I The Uniform Probate Code
also emphasizes the need for "[pirovisions designed to avoid the neces-
sity of guardianship or protective proceedings ... 132 These state-
ments reflect the view that retarded and other disabled persons,
"[w]hether under guardianship or not, should be permitted to partici-
pate as fully as possible in all decisions which will affect them." 133  In
situations in which guardians must be appointed, several state legisla-
tures have enacted laws delineating and limiting the powers and func-
tions of guardians.
One of the most innovative and flexible statutory schemes for
limiting the guardian's powers exists as a pilot program in Colorado,134
providing "protective services" for approximately four hundred mentally
retarded adults. The Colorado statutes require that the court's order in
guardianship proceedings "specify any legal disabilities to be imposed on
the ward"; 135 the statutes further outline specific provisions that the order
"may" contain "concerning the right to operate a motor vehicle, ...
enter into contracts, or any other civil, political, personal, or property
right." 3 6 The ward retains any legal right not specifically limited by
the court's order.'37  The Colorado Department of Social Services is
required to provide assistance which "the . .. department believes
necessary to help the ward function, to the extent of his capabilities, as
an independent, self-sufficient member of society." 3 8 These provisions
thus embody the sentiments expressed in the Uniform Probate Code and
CODE ANN. arts. 336-40, 354-62 (West Supp. 1975). Another consideration which might
enter into the choice of terms is that the federal government allocates funds to state
programs through the Developmental Disabilities Program to aid developmentally disa-
bled persons. Hodgson, supra note 7, at 419.
131. "Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons," supra note 108, at C-6.
132. ld. at C-5.
133. Id. at C-4.
134. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-3-101 to -114 (1973).
135. id. § 26-3-104(4).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. § 26-3-105(1).
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the AAMD policy statement; yet they are flexible enough to permit a
wide range of powers in the guardian.
New York'39 and West Virginia14 have recently enacted statutes
that offer a limited form of guardianship for those retarded adults who
have an occupation and are "wholly or substantially self-supporting."'141
The court is authorized "to appoint a limited guardian of the property"
who may "receive, manage, disburse, and account for only such proper-
ty" as the ward receives from sources other than his employment. 142 The
mentally retarded person has the right to retain and spend all of his
wages and may contract for any sum of money not in excess of one
month's wages.' 43 These limited guardianship statutes represent a prac-
tical means by which a ward may be placed under the supervision of a
guardian without losing the independence and self-reliance that comes
from being able to spend his earnings as he chooses.
More common than the limited guardianship statutes described
above are guardianship provisions that give a guardian the power to
exercise "general supervisional authority""' over such matters as the
ward's residence, education, employment, power to contract, and other
facets of his daily life. Under Minnesota's new Mental Retardation
Protection Act, for example, the guardian has the power to give or
withhold consent to the ward's marriage, to the performance of steriliza-
tion or other surgery upon the ward (subject to certain limitations), and
to the adoption of the ward. 145  The Act does, however, permit the
appointment of a conservator if the court finds that the ward requires
less than the full protection provided by a guardian; moreover, the
statute directs the guardian to "exercise his supervisory authority over
the ward in a manner which is least restrictive of the ward's personal
freedom consistent with the need for supervision and protection."'
46
139. N.Y. SuER. Cr. PRO. §§ 1751-55 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
140. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-IOA-1 to -5 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
141. N.Y. SUER. Cr. PRo. § 1751 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
142. Id.
143. According to the New York law, the ward may "bind himself for any sum of
money not exceeding one month's wages or earnings from such employment or $300,
whichever is greater." Id. According to West Virginia's limited guardianship provision,
however, the ward may "bind himself for any sum of money which in the aggregate shall
not exceed one month's wages or earnings from such employment or the sum of three
hundred dollars, whichever is less, in any one month." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-IOA-2
(Cum. Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.1 1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
145. Id. There is a separate section in the Minnesota Act which sets out in detail
the conditions under which a guardian may give consent to sterilization. Id. § 252A.13.
146. Id. §252A.11.
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Thus, even a broad legislative delegation of powers to the guardian may
be designed to accommodate the needs of individual wards.
Another method for delineating the guardian's powers is found in
Maine's statutes, which provide guardians for both mentally retarded
persons and incapacitated adults.147 Maine's laws give broad powers to
the guardian: for the mentally retarded, the duties are "to care for and
maintain [the] ward . . . . to obtain for the ward . . .education,
training, treatment, employment or care"; 4' for both the retarded per-
son and the incapacitated adult, the guardian has "custody of the person
of the ward and . . .determine[s] the ward's place of residence."""
Furthermore, the guardian "may apply for, and effect the placement of,
any ward . . . , in an appropriate home, hospital or institution
.... ,,150 Although there are no provisions for appointment of a
conservator or other protector with limited powers, the statutes provide a
means by which the powers of the guardian may be tailored to meet the
particular requirements of each ward. 5' At the close of the hearing on
the appointment of the guardian, the court must adopt a guardianship
plan "in accordance with the individual and specific needs" of the
protected ward.' 52 The public guardian is required to act within the
confines of this "detailed written guardianship plan";1"' consequently,
its actions will be limited to fit the needs of its ward. Thus Maine's law
presents another statutory alternative for reaching the goal of encourag-
ing self-reliance in the protected ward through limitations on the powers
of the guardian.
Several state legislatures' 5 4 have enacted directives to the guardian
that further this goal of fostering independence on the part of the wards.
Both California and Minnesota, for example, direct their public guardi-
ans to "permit and encourage maximum self-reliance on the part of the
developmentally disabled person under [their] protection."' 5 As sug-
gested above, this approach reflects the policies of such organizations as
the AAMD by recognizing that many developmentally disabled persons
147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3621-37, 3638-50-E (Supp. 1975).
148. Id. § 3628.
149. Id. §§ 3628, 3646.
150. Id.
151. Id. §§ 3621-37, 3638-50-E. See especially sections 3627 and 3645.
152. Id. § 3625.
153. Id. §§3 625, 3627, 3642, and 3645.
154. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 416 (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26-3-101 to -114 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252A.01 to -.21 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
155. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 416.17 (West Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 252A.15 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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can, with a minimum of restraints and assistance, function effectively in
society.
In addition to determining which powers should be delegated to
prospective guardians, legislators must decide whether to provide for a
public guardian or to depend upon private persons and organizations
to volunteer their services as guardians. Several jurisdictions have
chosen the former alternative: public guardianship powers are vested in
California's Division of Health,156 Colorado's Department of Social
Services, 157 Maine's Bureau of Mental Retardation,' 5 Minnesota's
Commissioner of Public Welfare,'59 and the Divisions of Mental Retar-
dation of New Jersey1 0 and Ohio."" The establishment of public
guardianship, however, has been criticized on several grounds; the
principal criticism has been of the potential conflict between the inter-
ests of the public guardian and those of the ward. The President's
Panel on Mental Retardation issued a Report of the Task Force on Law
which stated in part:
We believe that all retarded persons living in institutions, but
not admitted on their own application, should have outside guardi-
ans who could check on the ward's treatment, care, and release
possibilities. . . . The guardian should remain throughout the
spokesman for his ward, the lay interpreter of his needs, the parti-
san who watches over him and his interests, his alter ego in the
assertion of legal rights.' 62
Other criticisms of public guardianship focus on the cost of such pro-
grams to the state and the paucity of qualified persons available to
render adequate services to all wards. 63
A successful alternative to public guardianship is the private or
voluntary system established in New York' 64 and later adopted in West
Virginia.6 5 In addition to providing a limited guardianship, the New
York statutes provide that the appointment of the guardian is to remain
156. CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE § 416 (West Supp. 1975).
157. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-3-106 (1974).
158. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3621 (Supp. 1975). Note that with respect to
incapacitated adults, Maine's Department of Health and Welfare acts as the public
guardian. Id. § 3638.
159. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.02 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.4 (Supp. 1975).
161. OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 5119.86 (Page Supp. 1975).
162. HEW, THE PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LAw 27 (1963), cited in Hodgson, supra note 7, at 422.
163. Hodgson, supra note 7, at 421-23.
164. N.Y. Suiu. CT. PRO. § 1750-55 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
165. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-J0A-1 to -5 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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effective during the ward's lifetime. 1 6 They also allow for the nomina-
tion of a standby guardian empowered to act immediately upon the
death of the ward's parents. 16T New York's laws further authorize any
"non-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York" to act as the guardian of a mentally retarded person;
however, the corporation -has the authority to act only in the capacity of
a guardian of the person.168 Since adoption of the New York system in
1969, "a substantial number of guardians have been appointed" for
mentally retarded persons;169 the continuing increase in the number of
people using these provisions indicates that the flexibility offered by the
available options enhances the appeal of this type of voluntary guardian-
ship statute.
However, the availability of a public guardian program need not
preclude the use of an independent private scheme of guardianship;
recent legislation in some states employs both public agencies and
privatd persons to serve as guardians.170  In those states, the statutes
occasionally specify which type of guardian is preferred. For example,
one section of the Maine guardianship law for incapacitated adults states
that "the public guardian shall be ineligible if it is determined by the
probate judge that a suitable private guardian is available and willing to
assume responsibilities for such service."'171 Maine's statutes further
provide that, if a public guardian has been appointed by the court, "no
other guardian shall be appointed for the same ward during the contin-
uation of such guardianship"; 172 therefore, the guardian, whether public
or private, must serve its appointment exclusively. A combination of
the public and private forms of guardianship seems more desirable than
North Carolina's present system of private guardianship 173 because of
the flexibility it offers and the need it answers in providing guardians for
persons unable to obtain this protection from private sources.
166. N.Y. SuRR. Or. PRo. § 1752 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
167. Id. § 1753.
168. Id. § 1754.
169. Hodgson, supra note 7, at 434.
170. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 416.10 (West Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 3649 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-165.5 (Supp. 1974).
171. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3649 (Supp. 1975). There is no similar
provision in the statutes affecting the mentally retarded.
172. Id. § 3650-D. See a similar provision relating to the mentally retarded in
section 3636.
173. Although North Carolina has a system related to a public guardian, it appears
to be rarely used. Furthermore, the public guardian may act only when "a period of six
months has elapsed from the discovery of any property belonging to any minor, idiot,
lunatic, insane person or inebriate, without a guardian," or when a private guardian
requests the public guardian to serve. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-47 (1966).
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Role of the Courts in Guardianship Proceedings
After the powers of the guardian and the form of guardianship
have been determined, considerations of the due process and administra-
tive safeguards required in guardianship proceedings remain. Many
state legislatures have enacted new procedures for the appointment of
guardians, ensuring that due process is afforded to wards through guar-
antees of notice, hearing, appointment of counsel, opportunity to be
present and be heard, and periodic review of the guardianship appoint-
ment.17 4 The pilot program initiated in Colorado is but one example of
a comprehensive approach to ensuring full due process protection for
potential wards. 175 The Colorado statutes require that the hearing take
place within fourteen days of the filing of the petition; an attorney must
automatically be appointed to fulfill the duties of guardian ad litem; the
ward must be advised of his right to appear and be furnished with the
address and phone number of his attorney; and personal service must be
made within a specified time on the participants in the proceedings. 176
Colorado's statutes thus provide an ordered process in which the ward's
interests are carefully protected.
Other states have chosen to secure further the interests of potential
wards. For example, under the California Guardianship Act, "[i]f the
alleged developmentally disabled person is within the state and is able to
attend, he shall be present at the .hearing."'177 Thus, in the absence of a
physician's affidavit stating that the ward is physically unable to attend,
the ward must appear at the guardianship hearing.'7 8  The Act also
provides that before the public guardian is appointed for a developmen-
tally disabled person, "the court shall inform such person of the nature
and purpose of the guardianship. . . proceedings, that the appointment
of a guardian. . . is a legal adjudication of his incompetence, and the
effect of such an adjudication on his basic rights . . . .,,o Moreover,
the court is required to "consult with such person to determine his
opinion concerning the appointment."' 8
If a primary goal of the guardianship program is encouragement of
self-reliance and independence on the part of the ward, then these
174. See text accompanying notes 175-94.
175. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-3-101 to -114 (1973).
176. Id. § 26-3-104(2).
177. CAL. HEALH & SAFETY CODE § 416.7 (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. Id. at § 416.95.
180. Id.
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statutory provisions requiring the presence of the ward at the hearing
and direct consultation with the ward have much to recommend them.
Through his active participation in the proceedings, the ward has an
opportunity to view first hand the legal process that will so directly affect
his life, to express his opinions concerning this process, and to exercise a
degree of control-however small-over his own destiny. Presence of
the ward, appointment of counsel, and consultation with the ward at the
hearing are not, however, clearly required under the due process guaran-
tees of the Constitution; whereas notice, hearing, and opportunity to be
heard do constitute the minimum elements of due process which must be
provided in any system of guardianship. 181
In addition, several states attempt to protect the ward after the
guardian's appointment by requiring a periodic review of the ward's
progress, and by enabling the ward to obtain a reexamination of his
need for a guardian's protection.1 8 2 Under Minnesota's Mental Retar-
dation Protection Act,183 for example:
252A.16 Annual Review Subdivision 1. The [public guardian]
shall provide an annual review of the physical, mental and social
adjustment and progress of every ward. . . . Sub. 2. The [pub-
lic guardian] shall annually review the legal status of each ward
in light of the progress indicated in the annual review. If the
[public guardian] determines the ward is no longer in need of
guardianship. . . or is capable of functioning under a less restric-
tive conservatorship, the [public guardian] shall petition the court
* . . to restore the ward to capacity or for a modification of the
court's previous order.' 84
252A.19 Modification of Conservatorship; Restoration to Legal
Capacity Subd. 2. The [public guardian], ward or -any interested
person may petition the appointing court . . . for an order to
remove the guardianship . . . or -to restore the ward . . . to full
legal capacity or -to review de novo any decision made by the pub-
lic guardian . . . for or on behalf of a ward . . . or for such
other order as the court may deem just and equitable.185
181. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
182. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 416.18 (West Supp. 1975); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-3-111 (1973); M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3634, 3650-C
(Supp. 1975); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.16 (Cum. Supp. 1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5119.87 (Page Supp. 1975); New Jersey Division Circular No. 6, issued Feb. 1, 1967
by the Department of Mental Retardation (wherein the frequency of review varies
according to the I.Q. of the ward). As to the right of appeal, see N.Y. StuRR. Cr. PRO. §
1752 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
183. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.01-.21 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
184. Id. § 252A.16.
185. Id. § 252A.19.
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These provisions for periodic review and appeal are consistent with
Minnesota's stated policy "to provide a coordinated approach to the
supervision, protection and habilitation of its mentally retarded citi-
zens"; 86 through these sections, the Act furnishes valuable tools for
continually adapting the role of the guardian to the ohanging needs of
the ward.
After these due process considerations have been addressed, the
procedure for the appointment of a guardian must be formulated. The
legislature must determine who may initiate the proceedings, what inves-
tigations (if any) will be required before the hearing can take place and
who will conduct them, and whether the ward will have the right to take
his case to a jury. Maine's statutory scheme of guardianship for mental-
ly retarded persons and incapacitated adults resolves most of these issues
and provides a comprehensive model for the administration of guardian-
ship proceedings.
The nomination of the public guardian in Maine may be made in
writing by a parent, relative or friend of the ward, by the commissioner
of any state department or certain other government officials, or (for
mentally retarded persons only) by the present guardian or conservator.
Following its nomination, the public guardian must petition in the
probate court for its appointment to act as guardian. 187 The petition
must be accompanied by a medical certificate of mental retardation or
incapacitation and "a detailed written guardianship plan," the contents
of which vary according to whether the prospective ward is a mentally
retarded person or an incapacitated adult.'8 8 Finally, in the case of
guardianship proceedings for an incapacitated adult, the court names an
attorney immediately after the petition is received to act as guardian ad
litem, to represent the prospective ward until the public guardian is
appointed. 189  Thus, Maine's guardianship statutes clearly enumerate
the persons who may nominate a guardian, authorize the public guardi-
an to file the petition, specify the documents to be submitted with the
petition, and provide a guardian ad litem for the prospective ward.
The required medical certificate must state that the prospective
ward is "mentally retarded" or impaired; "a licensed physician and a
186. Id. § 252A.01 (emphasis added).
187. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, H9 3624, 3625, 3641, 3642 (Supp. 1975).
188. Id. H9 3625, 3642. Note that the guardian must act according to his duties
spelled out in the guardianship plan. Id. §§ 3627, 3645.
189. Id. § 3643. It is unclear why similar protection is not afforded to mentally
retarded persons.
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licensed psychologist" are required to examine the ward in order to issue
the certificate. 190 This medical certificate must be accompanied by a
guardianship plan defining the "individual and specific needs of the
[prospective ward]," but the statutes do not state who is responsible for
preparing the plan.19' Presumably, the persons who prepare the certifi-
cate also prepare the guardianship plan since they have examined the
prospective ward and are familiar with his "individual and specific
needs."
With respect to the right to a jury trial, Maine's statutes are silent.
New York, however, provides that when a minor ward for whom a
guardian has been appointed reaches the age of 18, he may petition the
surrogate court to have his guardian disoharged and may request a jury
trial.'92 Upon receipt of the petition, the court conducts a hearing at
which the ward has the right to appear. The statutes further provide
that the right to a jury trial is waived by the ward if he fails to make a
demand for a jury trial. Such a provision is at best curious. The ward
(who has no right to a guardian ad litem) may be legally unable to
waive the jury trial if he is indeed mentally disabled. In order to be
effective, a waiver must be made knowingly.' 9 It is doubtful that a
person with a mental handicap can be presumed to understand the
significance of his right to a trial by jury.
There is one consideration that may persuade lawmakers not to
provide for a jury trial. If the jury's function is to determine the mental
capacity of the prospective ward, then a situation could arise in which
the jury disagrees with the findings of a medical evaluation team. In
such instances, a jury of twelve persons with no medical training would
be able to overrule the findings of the medical specialists. 9 4
Summary
Guardianship statutes vary among the states according to the rela-
tive values that each legislature places on the factors affecting the
decisions to be made. While some states address only the mentally
190. Id. §§ 3623, 3625, 3640, 3642.
191. Id. §§ 3625, 3642.
192. N.Y. SuRR. Or. PRO. § 1752 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
193. See, e.g., Burke Grain Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 94 F.2d 458 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 661 (1938); Hager v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.
Supp. 22,27 (E.D. Ky. 1942).
194. See Hodgson, supra note 7, at 432. For a North Carolina case where the jury
did in fact disagree with the physician's statement see Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966).
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retarded, others include all mentally handicapped persons in their stat-
utes; while some states provide for public guardians, others provide only
for private guardians to fulfill the guardianship needs of their citizens.
Still other states rely on both the public and the private sectors to
answer the need for guardians. Some states afford the prospective ward
the rights to counsel, to be present and to participate in the guardianship
hearing, to have a multi-disciplinary evaluation both before and after the
appointment of a guardian, and to have a jury determination of the need
for a guardian. Other states provide for some, but not all, of these
procedural safeguards.
One problem encountered in attempting to evaluate -the differing
guardianship statutes is that most of these programs have been instituted
only recently; their long-term performance is therefore difficult to deter-
mine. However, by examining the issues addressed by other lawmakers,
those who would draft new statutes for North Carolina can at least
identify the problems to be resolved.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina's legislators must correct the inadequacies of the
state's guardianship statutes. The pejorative language should be re-
placed by terms that are better defined and less crude. than those
presently used to describe the mentally handicapped. Moreover, the
courts can be expected to strike down North Carolina's guardianship
statutes if the legislature does not also guarantee the due process rights
mandated by the federal and state constitutions.
North Carolina presently allocates responsibility for mentally ill
and mentally retarded persons to two different agencies under the super-
vision of the Department of Human Resources; 195 therefore, the creation
of a public guardianship could follow the pattern established in Maine.
Provisions similar to a limited guardianship plan exist already in North
Carolina's Patients Rights Act of chapter 122 of the General Statutes,
under which certain civil rights may be limited or restricted only after a
prior medical determination that such action is in the best interests of
the ward. The treatment plan under the Patients Rights Act must
specify all rights to be taken away. Therefore, a similar procedure for
persons who have guardians appointed for them would not be foreign to
North Carolina law.
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-138 (1973).
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Only when the recent changes made by other states are incorporat-
ed into North Carolina's statutes will this state's guardianship laws
provide "responsible impartial guardian[s] . . . to protect and effect
the exercise and enjoyment 196 of the rights of their wards.
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196. "Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons," supra note 108, at C-4.
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